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ABSTRACT

Micro aerial vehicles a.k.a. drones, have become an integral part of a variety of civilian and
military application domains, including but not limited to aerial surveying and mapping, aerial
surveillance and security, aerial inspection of infrastructure, and aerial delivery. Meanwhile, the
cybersecurity of drones is gaining signiﬁcant attention due to both ﬁnancial and strategic
information and value involved in aerial applications. As a result of the lack of security features
in the communication protocol, an adversary can easily interfere with on-going communications
or even seize control of the drone. In this thesis, we propose a lightweight digital signature
protocol, also referred to as DroneSig, to protect drones from a man-in-the-middle attack, where
an adversary eavesdrops the communication between Ground Control Station (GCS) and drone,
and impersonates the GCS and sends fake commands to terminate the on-going mission or even
take control over the drone. The basic idea of the DroneSig is that the drone will only execute the
new command after validating the received digital signature from the GCS, proving that the new
command message is coming from the authenticated GCS. If the validation of the digital
signature fails, the new command is rejected immediately, and the Return-to-Launch (RTL)
mode is initiated and forces the drone to return to the take-off position. We conduct extensive
simulation experiments for performance evaluation and comparison using OMNeT++, and
simulation results show that the proposed lightweight digital signature protocol achieves better
performance in terms of energy consumption and computation time compared to the standard
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic technique.

viii

I. INTRODUCTION
Micro aerial vehicles, a.k.a. drones, are ﬂying robots endowed with the capabilities of
sensing, computing, and wireless communicating, and becoming progressively popular in
various civilian and military application areas, including but not limited to aerial surveying and
mapping, aerial surveillance and security, aerial inspection of infrastructure, and aerial delivery
(Pu & Carpenter, 2019). The global small drones market is projected to reach USD 40.31 billion
by 2025, at a compound annual growth rate of 17.04% from 2018 to 2025 (“Global Small Drones
Market,” 2018). By 2026, commercial drones for both corporate and consumer applications will
have an annual impact of $31 billion to $46 billion on the United States GDP (“Commercial
drones are here,” n.d.). As the drone-based civilian and military applications are proliferating,
Internet of Drones (IoD), a layered aerial network management and control architecture, was
proposed and has been demonstrated as an applicable architecture for coordinating the access of
drones to controlled airspace and providing navigation services (Pu & Carpenter, 2020). With the
assistance of advanced communication technology as well as emerging computing infrastructure,
we envision that drones will deﬁnitely ﬁnd many new ways to improve the quality of our life in
the near future (Pu, 2019).
Due to both ﬁnancial and strategic information and value involved in aerial applications,
however, drones look especially attractive to attackers and become an ideal target for various
cyber-attacks (Lin et al., 2018). For example, in January 2016, Mexican drug trafﬁckers used
satellite navigation signal deception technology to send spoofed GPS signals to attack the U.S.
border patrol drone in order to illegally cross the border. In December 2011, Iran successfully
captured a U.S. Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel drone through spooﬁng the drone’s GPS
system. Nowadays, drones have started showing their impact in everyday life of ordinary people
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and have been considered as a supplement of humans in a part of the delivery in the business.
Business and technology giants like Amazon, Google, Facebook, and Walmart have started
delivering the products and services via drones for the speedy delivery and customer satisfaction.
However, aerial drone applications are vulnerable to a myriad of cyber-attacks targeting their
communication links with Ground Control Station (GCS), as well as with other air units (Sanjab
et al., 2017). Therefore, investigating potential cybersecurity threats against drones and
designing state-of-the-art security mechanisms are the top priority to improve the security of
drone applications.
Unfortunately, the open nature of the wireless channel and the limited battery capacity,
computing capability, and communication bandwidth make it become a highly challenging task
(Pu, 2018). Communication between drones and GCS is established by the communication
protocol via a wireless channel, which makes them vulnerable to various attacks since the
communication protocol does not support security procedures (Koubaa et al., 2019). The GCS
and drones exchange data through an unauthenticated wireless channel without encryption. Thus,
data communication can be easily hacked. For example, an adversary can send unauthorized
commands to the drone to take its control from GCS, and then catch and withhold the drone.
This example is exactly showing that how the “anti-drone-gun” operates (Dronebuster™, 2018),
or hijacking the drone to have it go to an arbitrary waypoint (Feng et al., 2019). Therefore, it is
critical to ensure the security of communication in drone applications.
In this thesis, we propose a lightweight digital signature protocol, also named as
DroneSig, to protect drones from man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, where an adversary
eavesdrops the communication between GCS and drone, and impersonates the GCS and sends
fake commands to terminate the on-going mission or even take control over the drone. In the
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DroneSig, the GCS generates a digital signature based on the command message by using the
chaotic system and appends the digital signature to the command message. Before executing the
received command, the drone validates the digital signature by comparing it to its own generated
digital signature from the received command message. If the validation of the digital signature
fails, the command is rejected immediately, and the Return-to-Launch (RTL) mode is initiated
and forces the drone to return to take-off position. We develop a customized simulation
framework and evaluate its performance through extensive simulations in terms of energy
consumption, computation time, CPU cycle, memory usage, and code size. We also revisit prior
AES, DES, and 3DES (Stallings, 2006), and modify them to work in the framework for
performance comparison. The simulation results show that the proposed DroneSIG can achieve
better performance in terms of energy consumption, computation time, CPU cycle, memory
usage, and code size compared to AES, DES, and 3DES.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Prior schemes are provided and analyzed in
Section II. A system model and the proposed DroneSig are presented in Section III. Section IV
focuses on simulation results and their analyses. Section V discusses the future work, Compare
the security of the protocol. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A signiﬁcant volume of research work has mainly focused on developing security
mechanisms and features to ensure the necessary security services of drones, such as
conﬁdentiality, integrity, and authentication, and protect drones from various cyber-attacks.
Srinivas, Das, Kumar, and Rodrigues (2019) described a temporal credential-based anonymous
lightweight user authentication mechanism is proposed to address the authentication problem in
the IoD environment based on a three-factor scheme using user’s mobile device, password, and
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biometrics. Ozmen and Yavuz (2018) proposed an optimized public key infrastructure based
framework integrated with lightweight symmetric primitives is proposed for small aerial drones,
where special precomputation methods and optimized elliptic curves are harnessed to reduce the
computational overhead and energy consumption. An encryption mechanism that improves the
communication security of open source drones is proposed based on Galois Embedded Crypto
(GEC) and ArduinoLibs Crypto library to provide safer and more secure communication service
for radio control link (Podhradsky et al., 2017). A medium-interaction portable drone honeypot,
also called HoneyDrone, is designed for protecting drones by Daubert, Boopalan, Mühlhäuser,
and Vasilomanolakis (2018). The basic idea of HoneyDrone is to emulate a number of dronespeciﬁc and drone-tailored protocols, lure adversary into attacking drone honeypot, and record
and analyze malicious activities to detect potential attackers.
According to Won, Seo and Bertino (2020), a lookup table shufﬂing mechanism that
supports white-box block cipher with dynamics is proposed to protect unmanned vehicles from
white-box attacks, where attackers with sufﬁcient knowledge of a target unmanned vehicle can
steal secret information stored in the unmanned vehicle through taking advantage of advanced
reverse engineering techniques and exploiting the vulnerabilities of open-source software. Since
no short secret key is used by an unmanned vehicle during the protocol, the shufﬂing mechanism
can be safely executed in the white-box environment and make it hard for a white-box attacker to
successfully encrypt/decrypt any plaintext/ciphertext even if the attacker has the knowledge of
the entire lookup table. A new system model is proposed to secure drone communication for the
data collection and transmission in the IoD environment, where public blockchain technology is
used for the storage of collected data from the drones and update the information into the
distributed ledgers to reduce the burden of drones (Aggarwal et al., 2019). According to
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experimental evaluation, the proposed system model makes the realtime drone-based
applications more reliable and scalable and can defend against various risks and attacks.
He, Qiao, Chan, and Guizani (2018) proposed that use information fusion by combining a
visual sensor and inertial measurement unit to detect GPS spooﬁng attacks in an airborne fog
computing system. In order to address the challenging information leakage problem of
eavesdropping attack, leverages the physical characteristics of wireless channels to achieve the
goal of secure transmissions in unmanned aerial vehicles communication networks (Li et al.,
2019). In addition, an overview of security threats and attacks against communication protocol
for unmanned systems and potential security solutions are also presented by Koubaa et al.
(2019). Liang, Zhao, Shetty, and Li (2017) proposed a blockchain and cloud storage-based
framework to guarantee the UAV data integrity. The hashed data records collected from drones
are stored in the blockchain network, and a blockchain receipt for each data record is also stored
in the cloud, which can reduce the burden of moving drones with the limit of battery and process
capability while gaining enhanced security guarantee of the data. The article presents the
ideology of the secure utilization of drones for inter-service operability in ultra-dense wireless
networks by exploiting the features of the blockchain (Sharma et al., 2017). Zhang, He, Li, and
Chen (2020) proposed a lightweight authentication and key agreement scheme in which there are
only secure one-way hash function and bitwise XOR operations when drones and users mutually
authenticate each other. The proposed scheme is comprised of three phases: the setup phase, the
registration phase, and the mutual authentication phase. In the setup phase, the control station
generates its master private key and other public system parameters. In the registration phase,
users and drones register on the control station and get their secret key via a secure channel. In
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the last phase, users and drones communicate with each other securely after establishing a
session key.
In summary, various cryptographic techniques have been well studied to protect drones
from cyber-attacks. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive and
lightweight defense mechanism against MITM attack for drones.
III. THE PROPOSED LIGHTWEIGHT DIGITAL SIGNATURE PROTOCOL
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the system model and chaotic system, then propose a
lightweight digital signature protocol, also named as DroneSig, to protect drones from man-inthe-middle (MITM) attack.
A. SYSTEM MODEL

Attacker

X
RC Transmitter

RC Link

Drone

Figure 1. System model.

This image shows a basic system diagram where there is a Radio Control (RC) link to be
used by the GCS to manually control the drone. However, the communication link between GCS
and drone is established via a wireless channel, which is vulnerable to various security attacks
due to its openness. To be speciﬁc, the GCS exchanges data with the drone through an
unauthenticated and unencrypted channel; as a result, the communications can be easily hacked
by a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. An adversary with an appropriate RC transmitter can
6

eavesdrop the communication between GCS and drone and impersonates the GCS and sends
fake commands to terminate the on-going mission or even gain direct control over the drone
(Srinivas et al., 2019). Here, a successful communication link attack without involving “antidrone-gun” has already been demonstrated on a popular DSMx radio protocol to hijack the drone
(Liang et al., 2017).
B. CHAOTIC SYSTEM
A chaotic system is a dynamical and determined system with the extrinsic nature of
nonlinear behavior, pseudo-randomness, broad-spectrum, and sensitivity to initial conditions. In
the past few decades, a state of disorder and nonlinear dynamics have been used in the design of
cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generators. These pseudo-random number
generators use the control parameters and the initial condition of the chaotic maps as their keys.
Without the right initial conditions, the correct pseudo-random sequence cannot be regenerated.
Dufﬁng map is a two-dimensional discrete-time and dynamical system that exhibits chaotic
behavior. It is widely known to display chaos for certain parameter values and initial conditions.
Dufﬁng map contains a single cubic term and is expressed below,
{

𝑦𝑛+1

𝑥𝑛+1 = 𝑦𝑛
= −𝑏 ∙ 𝑥𝑛 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦𝑛3

Table 1. Duffing Map

where a and b are constant parameters. The output of the Duffing map highly depends on
the initial conditions represented by x0 and y0. The constant parameters are usually sent to a =
2.75 and b = 0.2 to produce chaotic behavior. Disregarding the initial point (0.5, 0.5), the Dufﬁng
map outputs points around the Dufﬁng map attractor in a random way.
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(a) x0 = 0.4 and y0 = 0.6

(b) x0 = 0.6 and y0 = 0.4

8

(c) x0 = 0.55 and y0 = 0.45

(d) x0 = 0.45 and y0 = 0.55
Figure 2. Dufﬁng map with different initial conditions after 50 iterations.
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As shown in Figure 2, any change in the initial conditions will affect the plot of these
points.
C. LIGHTWEIGHT DIGITAL SIGNATURE PROTOCOL
The DroneSig adopts a technique that is similar to cryptographic encryption but requires
less computational resources. In addition, the DroneSig is designed to encode and decode binary
information without using standard cryptographic techniques, such as DES or AES. In DroneSig,
the digital signature is generated by using a random number generator, Dufﬁng map, which can
assist both GCS and drone to achieve the same key without the necessity to wirelessly share it on
a public wireless medium.
The DroneSig consists of three functions: byte substitution, matrix transformation, and
random shufﬂing.
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Message Command (256 Bytes)
Byte Substitution
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12 m13 m14 m15 m16

8

Inverse in GF(2 )
10001111
11000111
11100011
11110001
11111000
01111100
00111110
00011111

1
b'0
b0
1
b'1
b1
0
b'2
b2
b3 + 0 = b'3
0
b'4
b4
1
b'5
b5
1
b'6
b6
0
b'7
b7

m'1 m'2 m'3 m'4 m'5 m'6 m'7 m'8 m'9 m'10 m'11 m'12 m'13 m'14 m'15 m'16

Matrix Transformation
m'1 m'2 m'3 m'4 m'5 m'6 m'7 m'8 m'9 m'10 m'11 m'12 m'13 m'14 m'15 m'16

02 03 01 01

m'1 m'2 m'3 m'4

01 02 03 01

m'5 m'6 m'7 m'8

01 01 02 03

m'9 m'10 m'11 m'12

m*9 m*10 m*11 m*12

03 01 01 02

m'13 m'14 m'15 m'16

m*13 m*14 m*15 m*16

m*1 m*2 m*3 m*4
=

m*5 m*6 m*7 m*8

Random Shuffle Using the Duffing Map
m*1 m*2 m*3 m*4 m*5

......

m*252 m*253 m*254 m*255 m*256

Digital Signature (First N Bytes)
Figure 3. The overall structure of the DroneSig.
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Figure 3 shows the overall structure of the DroneSig. Each message command has 256
bytes and is divided into a set of 16-byte blocks. Byte substitution and matrix transformation will
be applied to each block, whilst random shufﬂing will be performed on all blocks. First, each
individual byte of 16-byte block is mapped into a new byte according to

1
1
1
1
1
0
0
[0

0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0

0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1

1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1

𝑏∗0
1 𝑏∗
1
1
1
1
∗
𝑏
2
1
0
∗
1 ∙ 𝑏3 ⊕ 0
0 𝑏∗4
0
0 𝑏∗
1
5
0
1
∗
[0]
1] 𝑏6∗
[ 𝑏7 ]

𝑏′0
𝑏′1
𝑏′2
=

𝑏′3
′

𝑏4
𝑏′5
𝑏′6
′

[ 𝑏7 ]

Table 2. Byte Substitution (1)
Here, (b∗7 b∗6 b∗5 b∗4 b∗3 b∗2 b∗1 b∗0 ) is the value of multiplicative inverse in GF (28) for input byte
(b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0). As an example, considering the input byte {95}. the multiplicative inverse in
GF (28) is {95}−1 = {8A}, which is (10001010).
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
[0

0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0

0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1

1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1

1 0
1
0
1 1
1
1
1 0
0
0
1 ∙ 1 ⊕ 0 = 1
0 0
0
0
0 0
1
1
0 0
1
0
1] [1] [0] [0]

Table 3. Byte Substitution (2)

According to Table 3, the result byte is {2A}. The process of byte substitution is done.
Second, the 16 substituted bytes in a block are depicted as a 4 × 4 square matrix, and each
byte of a column in square matrix is mapped into a new value that is a function of all four bytes
12

in that column. The transformation is deﬁned by matrix transformation in Figure 3. Each element
in the product matrix is the sum of products of elements of one row and one column. In this case,
the individual additions and multiplications are performed in GF (28). The matrix transformation
on a single column can be expressed as
𝑆′ 0,𝑗 = (2 ∙ 𝑆0,𝑗 ) ⊕ (3 ∙ 𝑆1,𝑗 ) ⊕ 𝑆2,𝑗 ⊕ 𝑆3,𝑗
𝑆′ 1,𝑗 = 𝑆0,𝑗 ⊕ (2 ∙ 𝑆1,𝑗 ) ⊕ (3 ∙ 𝑆2,𝑗 ) ⊕ 𝑆3,𝑗
𝑆′ 2,𝑗 = 𝑆0,𝑗 ⊕ 𝑆1,𝑗 ⊕ (2 ∙ 𝑆2,𝑗 ) ⊕ (3 ∙ 𝑆3,𝑗 )
𝑆′ 3,𝑗 = (3 ∙ 𝑆0,𝑗 ) ⊕ 𝑆1,𝑗 ⊕ 𝑆2,𝑗 ⊕ (2 ∙ 𝑆3,𝑗 )
Table 4. Mix Columns
Third, the 256 bytes of all blocks will be randomly shufﬂed using the Dufﬁng map to
generate the digital signature, which includes the ﬁrst N bytes of the shufﬂing output. The
shufﬂing process is reversible. When the drone receives the command message, it only executes
the command after verifying the authenticity of the digital signature, proving that the
communication has been held with the authenticated GCS. The drone will validate the digital
signature by comparing it to its own generated signature from the command message. If this
validation of the digital signature fails, the command is rejected immediately, and the Return-toLaunch (RTL) mode is initiated and forces the drone to return to take-off position.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this thesis, we develop a customized simulation framework to conduct our experiments
in terms of code size, memory usage, energy consumption, computation time, and CPU cycle.
We also revisit existing AES, DES, and 3DES (Stallings, 2006), and modify them to work in the
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framework for performance comparison and analysis. The size of plaintext is changed between
25 and 2000 KB.

(a)
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(b)

(c)
Figure 4. Performance of code size and memory usage against the size of plaintext.

First, the performance of code size and memory usage is measured with the changes in
the size of plaintext in Figure 4. Here, the code size is measured as the ﬁle size of the algorithm.
As shown in Figure 4(a) and (b), the DroneSig has the smallest code size in terms of encryption
and decryption algorithms compared to AES, DES, and 3DES. Because the DroneSig has a less
number of operations for encryption and decryption processes, which make the ﬁle size of
algorithms smaller. The AES has the largest code size in terms of encryption and decryption
algorithms because it is the most complex algorithm which consists of four transformation
functions: substitute bytes, shift rows, mix columns, and add round key. In Figure 4(c), we
measure the memory usage of four schemes. It is clear that the DroneSig has the smallest
memory usage compared to AES, DES, and 3DES.
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(a)

(b)
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(c)
Figure 5. Performance of energy consumption against the size of plaintext.

Second, we measure the performance of energy consumption against the size of plaintext
in Figure 5. As shown in Figure 5(a), the DroneSig achieves the lowest encryption energy
consumption compared to AES, DES, and 3DES. DroneSig consumes less energy because it
performs three lightweight operations: byte Substitution, matrix Transformation, and random
Shuffling. Most importantly, three lightweight operations are only executed one time in the
process of encryption. Thus, the lowest encryption energy consumption is observed by the
DroneSig. However, for AES, DES, and 3DES, the same encryption operations are performed in
multiple rounds. As a result, a large amount of energy is consumed. In Figure 5(b), it is clear that
the decryption energy consumption of the DroneSig is lower than that of the other three schemes.
Since the decryption is the reverse process of encryption, similar operations will be applied to
ciphertext. Therefore, the lowest decryption energy consumption is obtained by the DroneSig.
17

The total energy consumption is measured in Figure 5(c), where the DroneSig provides the
lowest total energy consumption compared to AES, DES, and 3DES. Because the DroneSig has
the lowest encryption and decryption energy consumption.

(a)
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(b)

(c)
Figure 6. Performance of computation time against the size of plaintext.
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Third, the performance of computation time is measured with varying size of plaintext in
Figure 6. The computation time is proportional to the complexity of the algorithm. As the
algorithm becomes more complex, it requires a larger computation time. In the DroneSig, there
are only three operations, and those operations are only executed one time for encryption and
decryption. However, AES, DES, and 3DES are traditional cryptographic techniques, and several
complex operations are executed in multiple rounds for encryption and decryption. Compared to
DroneSig, AES, DES, and 3DES are much more complex. Therefore, the DroneSig can achieve
the shortest computation time in terms of encryption and decryption, which are shown in Figure
6(a) and (b), respectively. In Figure 6(c), the DroneSig outperforms AES, DES, and 3DES in
terms of total computation time because the DroneSig can achieve the smallest encryption and
decryption computation time.

(a)

20

(b)

(c)
Figure 7. Performance of CPU cycle against the size of plaintext.
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Fourth, we measure the performance of the CPU cycle by changing the size of plaintext
in Figure 7. As shown in Figure 7(a) and (b), the smallest number of CPU cycles is obtained by
the DroneSig in terms of encryption and decryption. Since the DroneSig signiﬁcantly reduces the
number of operations in the process of encryption and decryption, a smaller number of CPU
cycles is required to complete the operations of encryption and decryption. However, AES, DES,
and 3DES are more complex than DroneSig. Thus, a larger number of CPU cycles is required to
execute all operations. In Figure 7, the total number of encryption and decryption CPU cycles is
measured for all schemes. The DroneSig provides the best performance compared to others
because the DroneSig can achieve a smaller number of CPU cycles in terms of encryption and
decryption.
V. FUTURE WORK
Although the analysis and simulation provided have proved that DroneSig is a
lightweight, low-consumption, and fast calculation method, there are some improvements that
can still be made. In Section IV, we compared code size, memory usage, energy consumption,
computation time, and CPU cycle. Nevertheless, these seem to only show that the performance
of DroneSig is good, but they cannot explain how safe it is. In this context, we will survey some
of the provided results, which can be improved or extended further.
Therefore, after a series of studies, we found two lightweight Micro Aerial Vehicle
protocols to compare with DroneSig. The first one is Micro Air Vehicle Communication
Protocol (MAVLink), a very lightweight, header-only message library for communication
between drones and/or ground control stations (Meier, 2009). The second is UranusLink,
Communication Protocol for UAV with Small Overhead and Encryption Ability (Kriz &
Gabrlik, 2015).
22

We will deploy two attack methods at the same time to compare the security of each
protocol. One type of attack can be an attempt to send random data in the encrypted portion and
attempt to provide some combination of valid commands on the receiver after decryption, see if
the length of the received data has changed. Another type of attack can be capturing the
communication during flight and try to use the captured comment on the next flight to see if the
drone executes.
To determine the security of cryptographic protocols, we intend to use the ISO/IEC
29128 method for evaluation testing. ISO/IEC 29128 is a newly proposed international standard
that USES formal methods, which used for improving the security assurance of cryptographic
protocols (Matsuo et al., 2010). Once the cryptographic protocol has passed ISO/IEC 29128
certification, especially at its highest level of assurance, the protocol will be absolutely secure.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we proposed a lightweight digital signature protocol (DroneSig) to protect
drones from a man-in-the-middle attack, where an adversary eavesdrops the communications
between Ground Control Station and drone, and impersonates the Ground Control Station and
sends fake commands to terminate the on-going mission or even take control over the drone. The
basic idea of the DroneSig is that the drone will only execute the new command after validating
the received digital signature from the Ground Control Station, proving that the new command
message is coming from the authenticated Ground Control Station. If the validation of the digital
signature fails, the new command is rejected immediately, and the Return-to-Launch (RTL)
mode is initiated and forces the drone to return to the take-off position. In order to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed approach, we developed a customized simulation framework and
compared it with prior approaches. The simulation results show that the proposed DroneSig is a
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viable and competitive approach defending drones against a man-in-the-middle attack.
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APPENDIX B: SIMULATION SOFTWARE SOURCE CODE
Sbox = (
0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE,
0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76,
0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C,
0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0,
0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71,
0xD8, 0x31, 0x15,
0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xEB,
0x27, 0xB2, 0x75,
0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29,
0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84,
0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A,
0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF,
0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, 0x50,
0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8,
0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10,
0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2,
0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64,
0x5D, 0x19, 0x73,
0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, 0xDE,
0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB,
0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91,
0x95, 0xE4, 0x79,
0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65,
0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08,
0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, 0x4B,
0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A,
0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86,
0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E,
0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE,
0x55, 0x28, 0xDF,
0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0,
0x54, 0xBB, 0x16,
)
InvSbox = (
0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81,
0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB,
0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4,
0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB,
0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42,
0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E,
0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, 0x6D,
0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25,
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0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D,
0x65, 0xB6, 0x92,
0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7,
0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84,
0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xB8,
0xB3, 0x45, 0x06,
0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01,
0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B,
0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0,
0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73,
0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x1C,
0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E,
0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA,
0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B,
0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78,
0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4,
0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27,
0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F,
0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93,
0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF,
0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83,
0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55,
0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D,
)
xtime = lambda a: (((a << 1) ^ 0x1B) & 0xFF) if (a & 0x80) else (a << 1)
def text2matrix(text):
matrix = []
for i in range(16):
byte = (text >> (8 * (15 - i))) & 0xFF
if i % 4 == 0:
matrix.append([byte])
else:
matrix[i // 4].append(byte)
return matrix

def matrix2text(matrix):
text = 0
for i in range(4): # 0~4
for j in range(4):
text |= (matrix[i][j] << (120 - 8 * (4 * i + j)))
return text
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def __sub_bytes(s):
for i in range(4):
for j in range(4):
s[i][j] = Sbox[s[i][j]]

def __inv_sub_bytes(s):
for i in range(4):
for j in range(4):
s[i][j] = InvSbox[s[i][j]]

def __shift_rows(s):
s[0][1], s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1] = s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1], s[0][1]
s[0][2], s[1][2], s[2][2], s[3][2] = s[2][2], s[3][2], s[0][2], s[1][2]
s[0][3], s[1][3], s[2][3], s[3][3] = s[3][3], s[0][3], s[1][3], s[2][3]

def __inv_shift_rows(s):
s[0][1], s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1] = s[3][1], s[0][1], s[1][1], s[2][1]
s[0][2], s[1][2], s[2][2], s[3][2] = s[2][2], s[3][2], s[0][2], s[1][2]
s[0][3], s[1][3], s[2][3], s[3][3] = s[1][3], s[2][3], s[3][3], s[0][3]

def __mix_single_column(a):
# please see Sec 4.1.2 in The Design of Rijndael
t = a[0] ^ a[1] ^ a[2] ^ a[3]
u = a[0]
a[0] ^= t ^ xtime(a[0] ^ a[1])
a[1] ^= t ^ xtime(a[1] ^ a[2])
a[2] ^= t ^ xtime(a[2] ^ a[3])
a[3] ^= t ^ xtime(a[3] ^ u)

def __mix_columns(s):
for i in range(4):
__mix_single_column(s[i])

def __inv_mix_columns(s):
# see Sec 4.1.3 in The Design of Rijndael
for i in range(4):
u = xtime(xtime(s[i][0] ^ s[i][2]))
v = xtime(xtime(s[i][1] ^ s[i][3]))
s[i][0] ^= u
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s[i][1] ^= v
s[i][2] ^= u
s[i][3] ^= v
__mix_columns(s)
def encrypt(plaintext):
plain_state = text2matrix(plaintext)
__sub_bytes(plain_state)
__shift_rows(plain_state)
__mix_columns(plain_state)
return matrix2text(plain_state)
def decrypt(ciphertext):
cipher_state = text2matrix(ciphertext)
__inv_mix_columns(cipher_state)
__inv_shift_rows(cipher_state)
__inv_sub_bytes(cipher_state)
return matrix2text(cipher_state)
def chaos(x, y):
line = encrypt(plaintext)
sep = [int(digit) for digit in str(line)]
k = len(sep)
dot = [] # seed
value = []
x1 = []
y1 = []
x1.append(x)
y1.append(y)
dot.append(x * 2 + y * 2.5)
for i in range(k):
if i > 0:
x1.append(y1[i - 1])
y1.append(-0.2 * x1[i - 1] + 2.75 * y1[i - 1] - math.pow(y1[i - 1], 3))
dot.append(x1[i] * 2 + y1[i] * 2.5)
for j in range(k):
random.seed(dot[j])
num = random.randint(0, k)
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value.append(sep[num])
new_sep = ''.join('%s' % id for id in value)
return new_sep

def inv_chaos(text, x, y):
sep = [int(digit) for digit in str(text)]
k = len(sep)
dot = [] # seed
value = []
x1 = []
y1 = []
x1.append(x)
y1.append(y)
dot.append(x * 2 + y * 2.5)
for i in range(k):
if i > 0:
x1.append(y1[i - 1])
y1.append(-0.2 * x1[i - 1] + 2.75 * y1[i - 1] - math.pow(y1[i - 1], 3))
dot.append(x1[i] * 2 + y1[i] * 2.5)
for j in range(k):
random.seed(dot[j])
num = random.randint(0, k)
re = sep[j]
value.insert(num, re)
new_sep = ''.join('%s' % id for id in value)
return new_sep
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